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An Englishman's Safe Port
F.J.J. CADWALLADER*
INTRODUCTION
A port is quid accrecantum, consisting of something that is nat-
ural, an access of the sea, whereby ships may conveniently come,
safe situation against where they may well unload.'
Thus spake the good Lord Hale and in so doing, albeit unwit-
tingly, provided the English shipowner with his first round of am-
munition in the running fight with those charterers who will
nominate ports that are neither convenient nor safe for use by the
shipowner's most cherished possession.
For the shipowner a safe port is one to which his ships may come,
transact their business and depart, without being exposed to physi-
cal or political dangers. To meet this natural requirement there has
grown up a body of law designed to give protection in those cases
where the shipowner has suffered loss as a direct result of a char-
terer requiring a vessel to use an unsafe port. It applies whenever
by the terms of the contract the charterer is enabled, in futuro, to
nominate as yet unnamed ports.
In its present form the doctrine of safe ports excludes from its
consideration those charterparties where the ports to be used are
agreed to by the parties and find expression within the body of the
* LL.M., Faculty of Laws, University College London.
1. BACoN's ABnMGMENT, "Prerogative", B. (5).
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contract. Indeed since the shipowner expressly hires his vessel for
such ports it can be said that he warrants its ability to reach and use
them, a factor which may explain the ready use of the reservation
of "or so near thereto as she may safely get," in case optimism has
blunted the keen edge of reality. Where the charterparty con-
tains a number of named ports from which the charterer is later
to make a choice, the non-application of the doctrine is less clear.
Judicial murmurings show that to imply a guarantee of safety of
the chosen port on the part of the charterer might be too unkind,
whilst to imply nothing at all could be considered in certain cir-
cumstances to be unjust.2 The position is presently bridged by com-
promise whereby in his nomination the charterer is required to
refrain from nominating the legally ill-defined "impossible port," a
feature as yet more spectral than law.8
In English law, therefore, the scope of the doctrine of safe ports
is broadly confined to those charterparties where, due to the ab-
sence of a named port, the subsequent nomination of the charterer
is required in order to fully activate the contract. At one time ar-
gument could be found for attempting to distinguish the nature of
the obligation of the charterer depending upon whether the charter-
party was one of voyage or time, the latter being the more na-
tural home of the insistence for safe ports. 4 Such argument, based
more on historical accident then concentrated legal thought, has
now ceased to be.
In order to examine the extent and application of the doctrine in
England, this work has been divided up as follows: Implied or
Express Safety; The Incidents of Nomination; The Attributes of
Safety; Proof and Damages.
_MPLIED OR EXPRESS SAFETY
It is stated by one authority that it is still open to question whether
in the absence of express condition for the use of safe ports the
law will imply such an undertaking.5 If this is so it does not ap-
2. Reardon Smith Line, Ltd. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food, [1962] 1 Q.B. 42, 110.
S. See Tharsis Sulphur & Copper Co. v. Morel Brothers & Co., [1891)
2 Q.B. 647, 652; and Akt. Oliveband v. Dansk Fabrik, [1919] 2 K.B. 162.
4. For the former position see West (Samuel) Ltd. v. Wright's (Colches-
ter) Ltd., 40 Com. Cas. 186 (1935); and The Pass of Leny, 54 Lloyd's List
L.R. 288 (1936). See now Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. Australian Wheat
Board, [1956] A.C. 266 (Austl.); and Compania Naviera Maropan S/A v.
Bowaters Lloyd Pulp and Paper Mills, [1955] 2 Q.B. 68, 74.
5. See T. SCRUTTON, SCRUTTON ON CHARTmPAR=s Am BILLS or LADING
(17th ed. 1964) 111.
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pear to be for want of attempts on the part of the judiciary to sup-
ply the answer. Certainly Mr. Justice Devlin appears to have en-
tertained no doubts as to the rectitude of implying such a term
should it be absent when, in dealing with the charterer's duty to
nominate ports, he stated: "There must . . .be an obligation to
nominate ... and there must be implicit in that some condition
about safety to prevent the making of a derisory nomination."6 This
conclusion had already been arrived at by Mr. Justice Wightman in
1851 when he somewhat more tersely exclaimed: "I do not know
what force can be given to the word "safe" when added to the word
port,"7 thereby no doubt gaining the silent plaudits of Lord Hale's
certainly attendant ghost. Similarly the terms "usual ports" and
"approved ports" have both been held to carry within them the im-
plied requisite of safety.8
From implying the safety of a port to implying the safety of a
berth to be nominated within a safe port is but a small step; a step
which the English judges have made with only the faintest sem-
blance of misgiving.9 The hesitation, if it be one, stems from the
special circumstances of a particular case in which the charterparty
required that the charterer "indicate" a berth. In the judgment, not
overblessed in clarity, it appears that the latch point is the word "in-
dicate" which, it was held, could not be said to contain any impli-
cations as to the safety of the object indicated.10 It is doubtful
whether even this much of the case survives today and to con-
sider it as merely moribund is an undeserved kindness.
THE INCIDENTS OF NOMINATION
When the charterer accepts that he will nominate only safe ports
he is undertaking that each port will be such that during "the rele-
vant period of time, [the] particular ship can reach it, use it and re-
6. Compania Naviera Maropan S/A v. Bowarers Lloyd Pulp and Paper
M1ills, E19551 2 Q.B. 68, 72.
7. Ogden v. Graham, 1 B. & S. 773 at 779 (1861). See also Axel Bros-
trom & Son v. Dreyfus, 38 Corn. Cas. 79, 87 (1932).
8. See Robert Dollar & Co. v. Blood Holman & Co., 4 Lloyd's List L.R.
343 (1920); Compania Naviera Maropan S/A Bowaters Lloyd Pulp and
Paper Aills, [1955] 2 Q.B. 68.
9. Lensen Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-Soviet Shipping Co. Ltd., 40 Com.
Cas. 320 (1935).
10. The Pass of Leny, 54 Lloyd's List L.R. 288 (1936).
turn from it without, in the absence of some abnormal occurrence,
being exposed to danger which cannot be avoided by good naviga-
tion and seamanship."'" To this must be added the fact that the
court will consider not only the immediate environs of the partic-
ular port, but also any special peculiarities relating to the route to
be followed by the vessel, particularly when one route only is avail-
able. Thus the need for a vessel to proceed up an ice-filled river,12
or through waters made dangerous by the presence of enemy war-
ships,13 in order to reach the nominated port, have both been held
capable of rendering the nominated port unsafe.
Once the undertaking applies, the liability of the charterer in the
event of breach is absolute, his knowledge as to the port's safety or
otherwise being a matter for conscience rather than law. Indeed in
the majority of cases the surprise of the charterer at the subse-
quent discovery of a port's unsafety is probably equalled only by
the surprise of the shipowner. Effectively the charterer guarantees
that the port designated will be safe for the particular vessel. It is
a guarantee that does not extend to the safety of the cargo, although
the fate of ship and cargo may be occasionally so intertwined as to
be inseparable, nor does it include any potential liability should the
chosen port prove to be "inconvenient."' 4 Ports may be old, their
methods slow, their employees slower or worse; such ports may be
mightily inconvenient but they are not unsafe.
Safety at the time of nomination
"The giving of an order to sail for an unsafe port is a breach of
the charterparty."' 5 Indeed nomination of an unsafe port may be
stated to be no nomination at all, being outside the terms of the con-
tract, so that the ship-owner may refuse to accept it and demand
that the charterer make a proper choice within the terms of the
contract. But what if the nomination is accepted-is there then
some form of express or implied waiver of the charterer's breach?
Two situations arise for possible consideration, depending upon
whether the actual acceptance is that of the master of the vessel or
of the ship-owner.
11. Leeds Shipping Co. v. Soci6t6 Frangais Bunge, [1958] 2 Lloyd's Rep.
127, 131.
12. Grace (G.W.) & Co., Ltd. v. General S.N. Co., [1950] 2 K.B. 383.
13. Palace Shipping Co. v. Gans. S.S. Line, [19161 1 K.B. 138.
14. Dobell v. Green, [19001 1 QJ3. 526; Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. Min-
istry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [19621 1 Q.B. 62. See also Asso-
ciated Lead Manufacturers v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S. Co., [1956] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 167 as to a "neighboring safe and convenient port".
15. Grace (G.W.) & Co. Ltd. v. General S.N. Co., 66 T.L.R. (Pt. 1) 147,
152 (1949).
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The acceptance by the master of the charterer's order causes no
difficulty at all, it being useless to seek to imply any form of waiver
which may be utilized against the ship-owner. This is so even if
the master knows of the port's unsafety at the time of the order, for
a master has no implied authority whereby he may alter the terms
of a contract entered into between charterer and ship-owner and
thereby destroy his employer's right to damages.1 6
Where it is the ship-owner who accepts the charterer's choice of
port then only in very rare circumstances, it is submitted, will such
acceptance act as a waiver of the breach and so bar a future right
of action should the port prove to be unsafe. Arguments advanced
in favour of the shipowner's acceptance being considered as waiver
proceed on the basis that at the time of the nomination the ship-
owner may accept or reject the port, but that in accepting he has
either expressly satisfied himself of its safety or must be taken as
impliedly agreeing to its safety, either case barring any right to deny
this fact at a later date. The argument lacks both substance and
ingenuity. The charterer's agreement that he will name only safe
ports must remove from the shipowner any obligation to satisfy him-
self as to a port's safety; to hold otherwise would be to rob the char-
terer's undertaking of any genuine force whatsoever. 17 The mea-
sure of the charterer's undertaking is that the shipowner accepts
a particular port in the light of the charterer's assurance, knowing
that should it prove false he has a ready means of indemnity against
loss.
The "abnormal occurrence"
When the charterer has satisfied the requirement that the port be
safe at the time of nomination, what then if it subsequently be-
comes unsafe? It is a problem which tends to titillate academics
rather more than it troubles the courts, shipowners or charterers.
The reason for this is simple. The continuing nature of the char-
terer's obligation means that literal safety at the time of the nomi-
nation is quite useless unless the port is also safe at the time of use
16. See Hall S.S. Co. v. Paul (R. & W.) Ltd., 19 Com. Cas. 384 at 386(1914). As to the position of a master in relation to variation of a contract,
see Pearson v. Goschen, 17 C.B. (N.S.) 352 (1864).
17. See Reardon Smith Lines Ltd. v. Australian Wheat Board [1956],
A.C. 266, 282.
by the vessel. The only exception to this is if the later unsafety
arises from "some abnormal occurrence;" a feature which rarely
plays any part in cases concerned with physical unsafety but which
has some relevance in cases of political unsafety. In dealing with
this particular form of unsafety arising subsequent to nomination
three general questions fall to be answered.
(a) If the unsafety of the port is discovered in time,
must the charterer nominate afresh?
At one time there was strong reason for believing that the answer
to this question might be given in the affirmative, based on the facts
of a tried and trusted case.1 8 However in the fairly recent past
three judges of the appellate court took time out to explain that
almost everybody had drawn wrong conclusions from the case and
therefore today the answer must be given as a tentative No.19 The
appellate court judges rested their opinions on the fact that once
the charterer has fulfilled the requirement to nominate a safe port
there is no room for an implied undertaking that he will nominate
afresh should that port subsequently become unsafe. It would in
fact seem quite reasonable to imply such a term in order to give
business efficacy to what may otherwise become a frustrated con-
tract, but for the moment the matter rests in this fasion and leads
naturally to the next question.
(b) What is the effect of discovering the unsafety
prior to reaching the port?
The immediate difficulties of the shipowner stem from the fact
that having accepted a perfectly valid nomination by the charterer
he is prima facie bound to take his vessel to that port, and further
that he is apparently unable to demand that the charterer nomi-
nate another port, although oddly the common law appears to re-
quire the shipowner to make the request.20 The position of the par-
ties at present may perhaps be stated as follows. The fact of "ab-
normal occurrence" is a feature which relieves the charterer of lia-
bility since he is not in breach; the fact of the subsequent unsafety
is a feature which may relieve the shipowner from liability for not
entering the port. The rightness of the refusal of the shipowner to
18. The Teutonia, L.R. 4 P.C. 171 (1872).
19. Reardon Smith Lines Ltd. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food [19621, 1 Q.B. 42, 89, 90, 116, 117, 128, 129.
20. See Compania Naviera Maropan S/A v. Bowaters Lloyd Pulp and
Paper Mills [19551, 2 Q.B. 68, 78. See also The Teutonia, L.R. 4 P.C. 171
(1872).
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enter such a port depends upon whether he is able to rely upon the
occurrence as frustrating the charterparty or upon some express
term of the charterparty which covers the eventuality and thus re-
lieves from his obligation. Deprived of these the shipowner is re-
duced to asking the court to imply a term that in such cases he has
satisfied his duties if he takes his vessel "so near thereto as she may
safely get."121 In the event, if the opinion of the appellate court is
later sanctified, a neat form of court-induced stalemate may be seen
to result. In truth it should be stated, however, that the position
is to some extent open to possible circumvention by delicate ap-
plication of common law subterfuge but it all seems unnecessarily
tortuous in such rather simple circumstances.
(c) Who must bear the loss in such cases?
As neither party is responsible for what happened in general it
would appear that each party must bear his own loss. To the extent
that the charterparty may be frustrated, special statutory rules
are applicable to time charterparties as a means of producing some
form of equity between the parties in relation to monies expended. 22
Should the vessel suffer loss or damage within the port by virtue of
the occurrence then this must fall to the shipowner's account. An
example of such an event has been instanced as a nuclear explosion
within the port, something which may bring a degree of irony to the
maxim that the loss lies where it falls.
TBE ATRIBuTEs OF SAFTY
The incidents which can lead to the declaring of a port to be un-
safe for the purpose of a particular vessel may be divided into two
broad categories, the physical and the political. From both of these
must be substracted obstacles or occurrences of a purely temporary
nature. The finding of the port filled with port workers of a violent
disposition, or stricken with an influx of unsolicited ice, are nei-
ther of them necessarily features which will support a shipowner
in a defence of unsafe port should his master refuse to enter and im-
mediately seek a port of better disposition.
21. ScRuTTON, supra note 5, at 118, doubts the likelihood of this.
22. Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, C. 40.
The Act does not apply in the case of voyage charterparties nor to bills of
lading.
The essence of the temporary danger is that it is one which, should
the master decide to wait, will not involve the vessel in "inordinate
delay; '23 a delay whose length and breadth must be determined by
the nature of the adventure and the terms of the particular contract.
A master seeking guidance in such circumstances may gain some
judicial succour from the statement that the temporariness or other-
wise of the danger is to "be determined on the estimate of the po-
sition which would be reached at that time by a well-informed and
experienced master; and a decision based on such an estimate will
not be affected by the fact that, in the light of after-events, it is
proved to be erroneous."124
Physical Dangers
By far the most numerous of the shipowners' cries as to the un-
suitability of ports come within this category; the result of ships
suffering harshly from the physical phenomena of the ports to which
they have been directed.
The factors which may be considered as rendering a port hazard-
ous are many and various. Low bridges which require the lopping
of masts so that a ship in ballast may escape the port she so satis-
factorily entered laden,2 5 bars which inhibit the entry or exit of the
laden vessel,26 insufficiency of water forcing a vessel to take ground
when her build belies such ability and to do so courts disaster,2 7 all
these may well herald the outcome of unsafety. Even the inability
of a vessel to enter a particular port without the use of tugs, when
tugs are not provided, has been held to render that port unsafe in
respect of the particular vessel.28
From time to time certain limits have been attempted upon some
of the above situations. Custom has occasionally been argued as a
means of showing that vessels are expected to load or off-load part
of their cargo one side of a bar and complete the operation on the
other side, but custom is now out of favour with the courts in such
cases. 29 In the event of insufficiency of water it has been held that
the mere fact that a vessel may have to leave her berth at particular
states of the tide does not necessarily render the port unsafe if such
movement does not seriously interfere with the performance of the
23. See Knutsford (S.S.) Co. v. Tillmans & Co. [1908], A.C. 406.
24. Grace (G.W.) S.S. Co. Ltd. v. General S.N. Co. [1950], 2 K.B. 383,
392, 393.
25. Limerick S.S. Co. v. Stott (W.H.) & Co. [1921], 2 K.B. 613.
26. The Alhambra, 6 P.D. 68 (1881).
27. Hall S.S. Co. v. Paul (R. & W.) Ltd., 19 Com. Cas. 384 (1914).
28. Axel Brostrom & Son v. Dreyfus, 38 Com. Cas. 79 (1932).
29. See The Alhambra, 6 P.D. 68 (1881).
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contract.30 If it is usual for vessels to take ground at the port then
the physical make-up of the particular vessel becomes all important
in determining liability for damage.31
The need for the port to suit the characteristics of the particular
vessel is perhaps best illustrated in those cases where the weather,
or the results of it, reveal the shortcomings of the port in question.
Ice is a frequent cause for alarm, so much so that an "Ice Clause"
is generally included in the relevant contracts to contain the situa-
tion. Ice-bound ports unattended by ice-breakers are distinctly un-
safe, whilst ice encountered by a vessel on its way up river to a port
may suffice to render a charterer liable if harm is caused to the ves-
sel. Breezes and gales are similarly great revealers of the limita-
tions of the charterer's choice. The fact that at the time of the nomi-
nation the entry to a port was calm, or that the winds were light or
moderate when the vessel reached the port, have no relevance as a
defence.32 What is required is that the particular vessel is able to lie
in safety when force eight gales as natural visitors are in operation,
or at least that in the event of rough weather the vessel will be able
to leave her berth in safety and thus stand out to sea until the rough
weather subsides.33 In such cases unsafety may rest on so small a
point as the failure of the charterer to give the master advance no-
tice of expected bad weather. In The Dagmar,34 the master of a
vessel ordered to Cape Chat, Quebec, expected to receive notice from
the charterer if bad weather threatened so that he might put his en-
gines in readiness and put to sea if the weather worsened. The char-
terer failed to inform the master that at this particular port it was
best to keep a vessel's engines on immediate notice nor did he take
any steps to obtain weather forecasts. A strong breeze which the
berth gave no shelter created a heavy swell and as a result of this
the vessel's mooring lines parted and she was driven aground. In
these circumstances Cape Chat was held to be just one more in a line
of unsafe ports.
30. Carlton S.S. Co. v. Castle Mail Co. [1898), A.C. 486. Contrast Smith
v. Dart & Son, 14 Q.B.D. 105 (1884).
31. See Hall S.S. Co. v. Paul (R. & W.) Ltd., 19 Com. Cas. 384, 387 (1914).
32. Johnston Bros. v. Saxon Queen S.S. Co., 108 L.T.R. (M.S.) 564
(1913).
33. See Leeds Shipping Co. v. Soci~t6 Francais Bunge [1958], 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 127, 131.
34. [1968) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 563.
Political Dangers
Cases actually decided on the basis of political activity rendering
the nominated port unsafe are somewhat sparse on the ground,
though ports so affected are none the less unsafe for that. The prob-
able explanation is that ports suffereing from such debility at the
time of nomination tend to be known to shipowners and can thus be
treated as nugatory nominations, whilst where the incident does not
exist at the time of nomination its subsequent manifestation will fall
for consideration as an "abnormal occurrence". Perhaps con-
stant political unrest in particular areas may one day lead the courts
to accept them as potentially unsafe even if enjoying a period of
comparative calm at the time when the port is nominated.
Ports unsafe within this category will include those where war,
confiscation, blockades or embargoes are part of the natural order
at the time of the charterer's direction. Ports providing merely
a prohibition on the discharge of the cargo carried cause a slight
difficulty. Some writers include this as a feature rendering the
port unsafe, but since there is no actual threat to the vessel it
would seem more fitting that such cases be decided on the grounds
either of an implied undertaking that the charterer will not act in
such a way as to prevent the shipowner earning freight, or that this
is foundation material for a doctrine of "impossible ports".85
The active threat of confiscation or the actual existence of a state
of war, (threatened war has been rather unsuccessful) ," are the best
examples of unsafety within the political arena-although even ac-
tual war may occasionally prove a little unstable if national rather
than legal considerations insert themselves. Certainly a sudden
burst of pride seems to have slightly coloured the judgment in
Palace Shipping v. Gans decided in 191537 and whose facts are as
follows. Under the terms of a time charterparty the charterers
agreed to nominate only safe ports. In pursuance of this duty on
the 13th of February 1915, when the war between Great Britain and
Germany was well underway, they ordered the vessel to sail from a
port in France to a port on the East coast of England. Two days
before this order, on the 11th of February, the German Government
had promulgated the following missive:
The waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the entire
English Channel, are hereby declared a military area. From Feb-
ruary 18th every hostile merchant ship within these waters will
35. Akt. Oliveband v. Dansk Fabrik (1919], 2 K.B. 162.
36. Ogden v. Graham, 1 B & S. 773 (1861). But see The Teutonia, L.R.
4 P.C. 171 (1872).
37. Palace Shipping Co. v. Gans S.S. Line [1916], 1 K.B. 138.
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be destroyed even if it is not always possible to avoid dangers which
thereby threaten the crew and passengers.
Whilst the shipowner protested the charterers' order the vessel nev-
ertheless sailed for the nominated port on the 19th of February and
after a considerable period arrived there in safety. Mr. Justice
Sankey, whilst accepting that the nature of the voyage which the
vessel had to make could form part of the circumstances to be con-
sidered, held the port to be a safe port, magnificently, if irrelevantly,
declaiming: "It is impossible to regard the results achieved [in rela-
tion to the threatened sinkings] as other than insignificant, or as
even appreciably affecting the strength and spirit of the British
mercantile marine".38
Perhaps one of the most interesting recent suggestions for widen-
ing the scope of incidents of political unsafety is to be found in the
judgment of The White Rose, decided in 1969.3 9 The case, although
not actively concerned with safe ports, revealed that a law in opera-
tion at the port of Duluth, Minnesota, might be considered some-
what more onerous than anything existing in England in so far as it
related to a shipowner's duties in respect of, and potential liability
for, the safety of longshoremen employed on his vessel. This point
led Mr. Justice Donaldson to speculate upon whether or not "this law
was so unusual as to constitute Duluth a legally unsafe port to which
the vessel should not have been ordered." 40 As the imagination of
counsel for the shipowner had not stirred itself this far, there the
matter rested.
On the fringe of this particular category is to be found the diffi-
culties which arise where vessels are ordered to strike-bound ports.
Here the English court has steadfastly refused to recognise as pres-
ent the ingredients necessary to make an unsafe port, although
whisperings as to the possibility of an impossible port have occa-
sionally been heard.4 1 The correctness of the attitude is best left un-
doubted, for strikes like bad weather may affect ports at any time
38. Id. at 142. On 7th May, 1915, The Lusitania was torpedoed and
sunk with a loss of 1,198 lives.
39. A/B Helsingfors Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Rex
[1969], 2 Lloyd's Rep. 52.
40. Id. at 59.
41. See the judgments delivered in the Court of Appeal in Reardon
Smith Line, Ltd. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1962],
1 Q.B. 62.
and to recognize within strikes the incidents of unsafety would
probably be to render the world in respect of safety, portless.
PROOF AND DAMAGES
The Burden of Proof
The safety or unsafety of a port in respect of a particular ship is
a question of fact and degree to be determined by all the circum-
stances applicable to each individual case.42 Apart from similarity
in principle, no one case is wholly helpful in determining another,
a very relevant point where it is the physical characteristics of a port
which are being called in question.
The burden of proof lies on the shipowner, it being for him to es-
tablish that the harm of which he complains came about as a result
of the charterer failing in his undertaking to nominate a safe port.
To succeed in his claims for damages it is not sufficient for the ship-
owner to show that the charterer nominated a port and that the
vessel suffered harm at that port. What must be shown is that the
"proximate cause" of the loss suffered was the charterer's order for
the vessel to proceed to an unsafe port.4 3 That the charterer's order
may be seen as "a cause" is undeniable, but that is not sufficient to
found legal liability. What is required is that the charter's order to
that port continues to operate up to the time when the loss occurs.
Should the chain of causation be broken, then whatever form of re-
dress the shipowner may otherwise have it will not arise from an
action based on the breach by the charterer of this particular under-
taking.
There may be a number of incidents capable of causing a break in
the chain of causation stemming from the charterer's order but that
most usually relied upon is an intervening act of the master. This
defence becomes available where despite the demonstrable unsafety
of the port the master is so imprudent as to nevertheless take in
his vessel-an act which may render the proximate cause of the loss
the negligent act of the master and thus release the charterer from
liability. The position is best shown by consideration of two cases
both concerned with ice damage.
In the first case 44 the master of a vessel directed to Abo in Finland
determined to force ice in order to gain access to that port; he did
this even though the charterparty did not require him to force ice
42. See Leeds Shipping Co. v. Soci6t6 Frangais Bunge [1958], 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 127.
43. Grace (G.W.) & Co., Ltd. v. General S.N. Co. [1950], 2 K.B. 383, 397.
44. Limerick S.S. Co. v. Stott (W.H.) & Co. [1921J, 2 K.B. 613.
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and in fact ice-breakers were available at the port. The court held
that the ice damage suffered by the vessel was proximately caused
by the act of the master and not from the charterer's order to pro-
ceed to Abo, which in the event was held to be a safe port.
In Grace v. General Steam Navigation,45 a vessel was ordered to
the port of Hamburg, and was therefore required to navigate up the
River Elbe. When the vessel reached the Elbe it was found to con-
tain quantitites of ice. The master, assessing the possible length of
delay in waiting clearance, together with the degree of danger and
the liklihood of harm, decided to enter the river and proceed to Ham-
burg. The vessel suffered ice damage on her way both to the port
and on leaving it. The court found that the master had acted pru-
dently in his assessment of the delay, and that in view of the na-
ture and degree of the danger the act of the master in proceeding
was not such as to amount to an intervening act.
The dilemma of a master so circumstanced in having to accurately
guage the situation and assess the degree of damage which may be
suffered if he proceeds as against the commercial loss which may re-
sult if he does not in order to avoid finding himself translated into
a novus actus interveniens was highlighted by Mr. Justice Devlin
when he said:
Suppose that the master thinks that the nominated berth is barely
large enough and that he might scrape his vessel's side and dam-
age her paintwork. If ... it is the only berth that can be nomi-
nated, is he to throw up the voyage? A master who entered a
berth which he knew to be unsafe ... rather than ask for another
nomination and seek compensation for any time lost by damages for
detention, might find himself in trouble. So might a master who
sought compensation for the time lost in sailing back across the
Atlantic because he had not cared to risk damage to his paint-
work.4 6
If the above prospects seem to render the position of the master
somewhat uncomfortable let it be said that whilst the English courts
accept the principle of novus actus interveniens, yet masters are
most infrequent victims of its application in these circumstances, the
court finding the prudence of masters legion in these cases.
45. Grace (G.W.) & Co., Ltd. v. General S.N. Co. [1950], 2 K.B. S83.
46. Compania Naviera Maropan S/A v. Bowaters Lloyd Pulp and Paper
Mills [19553, 2 Q.B. 68, 77, 78.
Measure of Damages
The charterer being in breach of the charterparty, the measure of
damages is governed by the ordinary principles applicable for breach
of contract. This enables the shipowner to recover those losses
which may be fairly and reasonably considered as arising from the
breach or that may fairly and reasonably be regarded as being with-
in the contemplation of the parties in the event of such a breach.47
The most natural damages in such cases arise either as an expense
caused by delay brought about by a nugatory nomination or expense
arising from repairs and consequent loss of use of the vessel where
actual damage to the vessel has resulted. Freight lost as a result of
a charterer's nugatory nomination would also be recoverable. There
is duty on the shipowner to mitigate his loss where possible, but as
a doctrine it is sympathetically applied.
CONCLUSION
One praiseworthy feature of the restatement of the doctrine in the
last twenty years has been the clear recognition that the charterer
should not be held liabile for abnormal occurrences, a feature not too
apparent in some of the older cases. However, what a shipowner
fails to gather under one term of the contract he may well seek to
garnish under another, the temptation to cast the charterer in the
role of an unwilling underwriter to an "all risks" port policy being
apparent inbred.
The development of the safe port in English law has been a rela-
tively peaceful and bloodless affair. The skirmishes of the past
hundred years have yielded a clear and adaptable set of principles
which seek to establish some semblance of equity between the par-
ties. If it is a fact that the only besetting sin of many charterers in
breach of their undertaking is an ignorance of their ports' infirmities
this must be considered the price to be paid for a freedom of choice
in determining those ports to which ships may safely come.
47. See Hadley v. Baxendale (1854), 9 Exch. 341. The effect of the prin-
ciples laid down in this case has been recently restated in Czarnikow Ltd.
v. Koufos [1967], 2 Lloyd's Rep. 457.
